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Abstract - This paper surveys the state of the art trust-based 
systems in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN); it highlights the 
difference between Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) and WSN 
and based on this observed difference (monitoring events and 
reporting data) a new trust model is introduced, which takes 
sensor reliability as a component of trust. A new definition of 
trust is created based on the newly introduced component of trust 
(sensor data) and an extension of node misbehaviour classification 
is also presented based on this new component of trust. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) as a special type of mobile 
ad hoc networks (MANET) has an additional function to the 
traditional functions of an ad hoc network, which is monitoring 
events and reporting data. This observed difference is the 
foundation of our new approach to model trust in WSN. 
 
Trust in WSN plays an important role in constructing the 
network and making the addition or deletion of sensor nodes 
from a network very smooth and transparent. The creation, 
operation, management and survival of WSN are dependent 
upon the cooperative and trusting nature of its nodes, therefore 
the trust establishment between nodes is a must. 
 
Trust as prerequisite to secure communication between 
nodes, somebody might ask, How can we be sure that all nodes 
are trusted in order to establish a secure communication 
between them? There must be a new mechanism to establish 
trust in top of the existing mechanisms, so we introduce a new 
approach of establishing trust (assessing the node behaviour) 
using the sensor data as discussed in section 3. So our main 
contribution in this paper is introducing the sensor data as an 
additional metric (decisive component) to check the 
trustworthiness of a node which is to the best of our knowledge 
has not been addressed before. 
 
In this paper we redefined trust in WSN based on the 
existing definitions and the newly introduced component of 
trust (sensor data) and we introduce a new trust computational 
model based on that. And we presented a survey on WSN trust 
based systems to help researchers getting a brief description of 
the problem and also to use it as a starting point to do a further 
research in the area. The rest of the paper is organised as 
follows: Section 2 presents our new trust definition and the 
properties of trust in WSN. We present all the related work 
done in the area in section 3. Section 4 presented modelling 
trust in WSN using the newly introduced component. In 
section 5 we introduced a new approach of trust formation and 
section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  TRUST DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES 
 
Trust has been defined differently by researchers belong to 
different research communities. Even in the same research field 
trust can be defined in a different way depends on the 
application and the methodology used to calculate trust. We 
believe that properly defining trust in WSN is the key to 
understand the meaning of trust and to easily model trust, 
which is not yet done properly. So firstly we will try to define 
trust based on the trust classification discussed in [1] and the 
newly introduced component of trust (sensor data) as discussed 
later in the paper and from the definition we will be extracting 
the properties of trust. 
 
Here we will use the same approach given in [1] and [2] to 
redefine trust with the introduction of the sensor data as a 
major player of defining trust. The main trust construct as 
discussed in [1] are: trusting behaviour, trusting intention, 
trusting beliefs and dispositional trust (risk). According to [2] 
trust can be classified into two types; reliability trust (trusting 
behaviour) and decision trust (trusting intention, trusting 
beliefs and risk). Here we are introducing sensor data as a trust 
component, so we are redefining trust from communication and 
data point of views, based on that our new definition of trust is; 
Trust is the node’s belief in the competence and the reliability 
of another node. In other words; Trust is the subjective 
probability by which node A depends on node B to fulfil its 
promises in performing an action and at the same time being 
reliable in reporting its sensor data (here we are checking the 
competence of the node and its reliability and truthfulness of 
reporting data).      
 
2.1.  Properties of trust 
From the above definition we can extract the following trust 
properties to help modelling trust efficiently.  
• Trust is subjective - It is based on observations and 
evidence made available to the node in a specific 
situation. 
• Trust is linked with risk - There is no reason to trust if 
there is no risk involved.  
• Trust is intransitive - If node A trusts node B and node 
B trusts node C, this does not necessarily imply node 
A trusts node C.  
• Trust is dynamic - Trust may decrease or increase by 
the time based on new evidence or experience. 
• Trust is Asymmetric - Two nodes do not need to have 
similar trust in each other or about the trustworthiness 
of another node. 
• Trust is reflexive - A node always trusts itself. 
 
3.  RELATED WORK 
 
Trust in general has been the focus of many researchers for 
the last decade, many of them were addressing trust using 
different techniques to model reputation in different scenarios, 
mainly peer to peer networks and the internet such as in [3-7]. 
Trust in WSN is a new area of research and only very few 
people started to look at the problem such as in [1, 8-13]; 
however a number of people addressed some of the trust 
management aspects in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), 
which closely resembles the WSN operation such as in [14-18]. 
In this section we will focus only on the work specifically 
addressing trust in WSN.     
 
The authors of [8] are proposing to use a single trust value to 
a whole group (cluster), they are using a group trust 
management scheme based on their believe that sensor nodes 
mostly fulfil their responsibilities in a cooperative manner 
rather than individually. Therefore instead of calculating 
individual trust, it is more appropriate to calculate the trust for 
the entire group.  This design might help saving node resources 
as the authors claim but it suffers from the following 
drawbacks, if one node is compromised (the cluster head for 
ex.) it will affect the whole group and also malicious nodes 
within the cluster will have the same trust value as the normal 
nodes (malicious nodes are difficult to be excluded. Trust in 
groups might be beneficial when the node has the choice to 
join  a group that can bring it most benefit [3] and also when 
there is a high mobility in the network, which is not the case in 
WSN as the nodes are mainly deployed to monitor an event. In 
section (5) we are proposing a new approach to calculate trust, 
which we believe is more robust and more efficient than the 
suggested approach in [8] and addresses its drawbacks.  
 
The authors of [8] are calculating the group trust in three 
phases, trust calculation at the node, at the cluster head and at 
the base station. The authors are assuming each node to have a 
unique ID in the group, and that is not the case in WSN as they 
are deployed in tens of thousands of nodes and the assignment 
of unique IDs is not possible and the authors are recognising 
that as a problem in their conclusion remarks. In their scheme 
[9], which is based on a distributed trust model to produce trust 
relationship for sensor networks, they use personal reference 
and reference as inputs parameters to define trust value 
(intention). Personal reference according to [9] consists of 
cryptographic operations parameters, which represent the 
security mechanisms and node interactive behaviour parameter, 
which reflects node availability. We think the scheme in [9] is 
very complicated especially the security part as they are 
assuming the communication is happening between base 
station and node, which is going to generate lots of traffic, 
(Base stations should not and can not communicate with all 
nodes, as the range of a node is small, instead nodes in a 
cluster talk to their cluster head, and cluster heads talk to a sink 
or a base station. 
 
The authors of [10] were the first to introduce  sensor data in 
their scheme as a function of the watchdog mechanism to 
calculate trust and according to them the web of trust 
embedded in every network is used to predict the behaviour of 
nodes in the network. In their scheme presented in [10], 
reputation is not a physical quantity but it is a belief; and trust 
is obtained by taking the statistical expectation of the 
probability distribution representing the reputation between the 
two nodes. The scheme operates on the principle of Bayesian 
decision theory (past behaviour of a node can be used to 
predict its future behaviour). In their Bayesian representation 
(BRSN) given in [10], they are assuming the presence of some 
sort of node authentication technique, which is required to 
achieve a trustworthy sensor network but on the other hand we 
argue that due to the mass deployment of sensor nodes in a 
WSN, it will be very difficult to authenticate nodes. 
 
The authors of [13] are using in their proposed scheme 
(DRBTS) special nodes known as beacon nodes (BNs) to assist 
other sensor nodes (SNs) to determine their location based on a 
simple majority principle. They are proposing a trust system 
for excluding malicious BNs that provide false location 
information. In the proposed scheme BNs are monitoring other 
BNs behaviour, but what about the SNs themselves? If a sensor 
node is compromised, what is the solution? These questions are 
not addressed. They are modelling the network as an 
undirected graph G = (V; E), with the set of vertices V being 
the set of SNs and BNs and the set of edges E being the link 
between them. The proposed system has some additional 
overhead and also requires extra memory to store the 
reputation tables [13]. 
 
4.  MODELLING TRUST IN WSN 
 
Trust modelling represents the trustworthiness of each node 
in the opinion of another node, thus each node associates a 
trust value with every other node [4], and based on that trust 
value a risk value required from the node to finish a job can be 
calculated. As illustrated in Fig. 1, node X might believe that 
node Y will fulfil 40% of the promises made, while node Z 
might believe that node Y will fulfil 50% of the promises 
made.   
 
 
   
Fig. 1. A simple trust map [4] 
 
In other words trust modelling is simply the mathematical 
representation of a node’s opinion in another node in a 
network. We argue that almost all the previous work of 
modelling trust are approaching the problem from a 
communication point of view and to the best of our knowledge 
no one is using sensor data as a trust component other than the 
authors of [10], which are looking at it as a function of the 
watchdog mechanism, which we believe is not sufficient as the 
main goal of deploying a WSN is to gather and report 
information regarding an event, so we are treating the sensor 
data as a decisive component of trust as shown in Fig. 2. At the 
beginning the reputation will be calculated based on the direct 
and indirect communication with the node as discussed in our 
previous work in [12]. 
 
The new approach is calculating trust in a different way, the 
output of the reputation is coupled with the validity of the 
sensor data reported from that node and based on that the trust 
value will be calculated (the trustworthiness of a node will be 
determined). The sensor data reported from the node will be 
tested against a predefined threshold, and if the reputation 
value is enough to do the job (greater or equal to a threshold) 
and the sensor data is above or equal the predefined threshold, 
then the node will be considered as trustworthy otherwise a 
question mark will be put on the node and it will be given 
another chance to report data in a predetermined period of 
time, and so on. Detailed analysis of the data and how is it 
going to be tested will be in our future work. 
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Fig. 2. Trust computational model for WSN 
 
4.1.  Trust Formation in WSN 
Trust is calculated based on the QoS characteristics 
(reliability, availability, power, processing speed, memory, 
data rate…) the main sources for calculating trust as given in 
Fig. 2 are: 
 
• Sensor Data - Data authentication, expected value 
• Observation (experience) - Direct, from the node itself 
• Recommendations - Indirect, from surrounding nodes 
• Dispositional Trust - The risk, a node is ready to take 
(new node) 
• Reputation (past experience) - In case no observation 
and experience are available 
 
Trust formation can be divided into 3 stages, the stage of 
initializing trust, the stage of building trust and the stage of 
updating trust. 
 
The initialization process, when the network first 
constructed or when a new node is introduced to the network 
can be in any of the following methods: 
1) All nodes are considered to be trustworthy. This is the 
quickest method of establishing trust, but it is very risky as 
malicious node can be given a higher trust value. It is a 
practical method when the network deployment is not for a 
critical mission (reading temperature)  
2) All nodes are considered to be untrustworthy. It is very slow 
method (trust formation takes very long time to be established, 
but on the other hand it is very robust and can be used in a 
critical mission networks (battlefields). 
3) All nodes are neutral; they are neither trustworthy nor 
untrustworthy. It is in between compared to the other 
mentioned methods. 
 
The building stage is the process of forming (calculating) 
trust from direct interactions, which can be achieved by using a 
watchdog mechanism as in [10] and [13] to monitor the 
surrounding nodes and indirect interactions (recommendations 
received from surrounding nodes). Most systems are using 
both direct and indirect interactions (positive and negative or 
just either one of them) to update trust, some use only direct 
interactions and others use only indirect information. In [10], 
only positive direct experience is exchanged with the 
surrounding nodes, while in [13], both positive and negative 
information is exchanged. 
 
The evolution stage is the process of updating trust, which 
can be achieved using the first hand information, the second 
hand information or both.  Most systems proposed so far use 
both first hand and second hand information. The main issue 
here is how to weight that information? Some systems give 
more weights to the old experience, other systems give more 
weight to recent experience (aging) such as in [10] and [13].  
 
Trust values regarding other nodes should be maintained 
locally and updated periodically as new evidence (direct or 
indirect observation) becomes available. Thus, trust evolves 
with time as a result of evidence [5]. The evolution process can 
be regarded as iterating the process of trust formation as 
additional evidence becomes available. The level of trust must 
be modified as additional evidence becomes available and that 
will change the risk assessment of the node [6]. 
 
4.2.  Node Misbehaviour in WSN 
The main idea behind reputation and trust-based systems is 
to discover the misbehaving nodes and also to be very robust 
solutions against insider attacks (to exclude misbehaving nodes 
and to minimise the damage caused by inside attackers). Most 
of the researchers are classifying node misbehaviour from the 
communication point of view, however as discussed so far, 
WSN are deployed to sense events and report data, so we are 
expanding the node misbehaviour diagram given in [11] by 
introducing a new branch to node misbehaviour addressing 
sensor data (misinforming) as a new classification of node’s 




Fig. 3. Node misbehaviour classification 
 
As can be seen from the diagram in Fig. 3, the new branch 
dealing with sensor data includes the misinforming behaviour 
of a sensor node which can be caused due to a faulty node 
(damaged or expired), a noise (as sensor data is not without 
noise), a malicious node or environment (node get captured or 
the environment is stuffed) or a communication failure 
(communication between nodes is cut off for some reason. 
Readers are advised to refer to [13] to get a detailed 
information regrading the node misbehaviour communication 
branch of the diagram given in Fig. 3. 
 
5.  A NEW APPROACH OF TRUST FORMATION 
 
Up to this moment and to the best of our knowledge all the 
research been done in MANET and WSN is taking into 
considerations the components of trust from a communication 
point of view. In WSN there is more than just communication 
and computation, there is a sensing data, as the main goal of 
distributing sensor is to monitor some events and to gather 
some data. We argue that to the best of our knowledge we are 
the first researchers to address trust in WSN in terms of 
sensing data. We based our new approach in this section based 
on the existing work done by [8] with the following 
modifications: 
 
Due to the massive deployment of nodes, the large area of 
coverage and the short communication range (distance) 
between nodes in WSN; nodes are grouped in a small ad hoc 
networks (clusters) and every node is keeping a record of only 
the surrounding nodes (to save resources). Each cluster has got 
a cluster head (reporting node) which communicates with other 
cluster heads or directly with the base station and off to the 
outside world (Internet). Here we are not giving a single trust 
value for each group as the authors of [8] suggested,  instead 
we are using the default repeated small world phenomena, 
which means as individual nodes forms an ad hoc network 
between themselves, cluster heads and base stations do exactly 
the same with their surrounding counterparts and so on, until 
reaching the coverage of the whole network. 
 
For example, as shown below in the Fig. 4; nodes A, B, C, 
D, E form a cluster with node R as a cluster head; nodes, F, G, 
H, I, J form another cluster with node S as a cluster head and 
nodes K, L, M, N, O forms a third cluster with node T as a 
cluster head. Nodes R, S and T form a cluster of cluster heads 
and so on, untill the convergence of the whole network; with 




Fig. 4. A new trust model 
 
The approach we are presenting  here is different from the 
approach given in [8]; according to them the cluster head will 
aggregate all trust values for all nodes to base station and the 
base station will calculate the group trust value and report it 
back; which produces in our opinion an extra overhead on the 
cluster head as communication is the major resource consumer 
in the whole process. And as we discussed before group trust 
value is not recommended as the whole group can be affected 
in case of a cluster head get captured. Instead, in our approach 
we suggest that individual nodes in the cluster will have trust 
values for all the nodes in the cluster based on their direct and 
indirect interactions as shown in our previous work [12]. 
 
In addition we introduced in this approach a new trust 
component, which is the actual sensing data as a decisive 
component of node trustworthiness. We argue that, the same 
phenomena is valid for the cluster heads; every cluster head is 
keeping a record of every other cluster head in the 
surroundings as was the case within the cluster, and cluster 
heads report their trust in each other as a recommendation to 
the base station. The base station compares and calculates the 
trust in each cluster head based on the direct and indirect 
interactions with the cluster heads and also on the data reported 
from the cluster head. Following this design, we can exclude 
misbehaviour nodes from within the cluster at the cluster level 
and misbehaviour cluster heads from within the cluster heads 
cluster at the cluster heads level and so on till reaching the 
entire network level. Here we assume clusters are more 
powerful than normal nodes and base stations are of more 
power than the cluster heads. Also in our approach, we are 
combining the communication process and the sensor data to 
calculate trust not just the communication process as been the 
case with almost all the previous work done by all researchers 
to this moment. 
 
The authors of [8] are calculating trust in three different 
phases to get the group trust value and in our opinion if one 
phase is wrong the whole result will be wrong and  that is the 
dangerous thing about it, our scheme is calculating  trust (the 
whole trust) at different stages (node, cluster, base station). The 
model suggested in [8] also does not say how to formulate trust 
with newly joining nodes (or what is the initial trust between 
nodes, just as they meet for the first time with no experience or 
recommendations available). 
 
Scenario; let us consider the following design, we have 
deployed a network as shown in Fig. 4. where sensors are 
gathering the temperature of a specific area,  the trust between 
nodes in the cluster is calculated as discussed in our work in 
[12]. The cluster head is periodically gathering data from all 
nodes in the cluster. If the data gathered from a node deviate 
more than a predefined threshold of the actual and estimated 
value, then the trust value will be affected as we will be 
discussing in our future work. Sensor readings are not without 
noise, so when we judge a reading we take into consideration 
the noise which can be represented as a Gaussian noise.  
 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper we introduced a new decisive component of 
trust in WSN (sensor data) and based on that component we 
redefined trust in WSN, we introduced a new approach of 
modelling trust and we also introduced a new classification of 
nod misbehaviour in WSN. We also presented a survey on all 
the trusted systems in WSN. The newly presented approach is 
believed to be very robust as it addresses all the drawbacks 
from the existing approaches. In our future work we are going 
to select a mathematical tool to represent our trust model and 
simulate a network using a network simulator to verify results 
and finally we are planning of setting up a test bed of WSN to 
further verify results.  
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